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Abstract— Though having achieved some progresses, the
hand-crafted texture features, e.g., LBP [23], LBP-TOP [11]
are still unable to capture the most discriminative cues between
genuine and fake faces. In this paper, instead of designing
feature by ourselves, we rely on the deep convolutional neural
network (CNN) to learn features of high discriminative ability in
a supervised manner. Combined with some data pre-processing,
the face anti-spoofing performance improves drastically. In the
experiments, over 70% relative decrease of Half Total Error
Rate (HTER) is achieved on two challenging datasets, CASIA
[36] and REPLAY-ATTACK [7] compared with the -state-of-
the-art. Meanwhile, the experimental results from inter-tests
between two datasets indicates CNN can obtain features with
better generalization ability. Moreover, the nets trained using
combined data from two datasets have less biases between two
datasets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Face anti-spoofing, as a security measure for face recog-
nition system, are drawing increasing attentions in both aca-
demic and industrial fields. However, due to the diversity of
spoofing types, including print-attacks, replay-attacks, mask-
attacks, etc., it is still a difficult work to distinguish various
fake faces. In Fig. 1, some randomly sampled genuine and
fake face images are shown to evaluate the anti-spoofing
ability of our eyes. Among all the face images, three are
genuine and five are fake 1. Admittedly, no obvious visual
cues are available for us to pick the genuine face images
from the gallery.
Recently, researchers are devoted to come up with
more generalized and discriminative features for face anti-
spoofing, such as LBP [23][35], HOG [20][35], LBP-TOP
[11], DoG [30] [27], etc. In general, these features are all
called hand-crafted features because they are designed man-
ually. In this paper, however, we exploit deep convolutional
neural network (CNN) for face anti-spoofing. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first attempt. Compared with
above hand-crafted features, the features learned from CNN
are able to catch more discriminative cues in a data-driven
manner. More importantly, according to the experimental
results, it has the potential to learn more general features
for various spoofing types.
II. RELATED WORKS
Due to the diversity of spoofing attacks, existing face anti-
spoofing approaches can be mainly categorized into four
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1The second and third images in the top row, and the third image in the
bottom row are genuine
Fig. 1. Genuine and fake face images from REPLAY-ATTACK dataset.
groups: texture based, motion based, 3D-shape based and
multi-spectral reflectance based. Besides, some other works
combined two or more of these methods to improve the anti-
spoofing performance.
1) Texture-based Anti-Spoofing: In [22], Li et al. proposed
a method based on the analysis of Fourier spectra. In this
method, it is assumed that the photographs contain fewer
high frequency components compared with genuine faces.
In [30], Tan et al. used a variational retinex-based method
and the difference-of-Gaussian (DoG) filers to extract latent
reflectance features on face images. Inspired by Tan’s work,
Peixoto et al. [27] combined the DoG filters and standard
Sparse Logistic Regression Model for anti-spoofing under
extreme illuminations. After that, Ma¨a¨tta¨ et al. [23] pro-
posed to use LBP features for anti-spoofing, which outper-
formed previous methods on the NUAA Photograph Imposter
Database [31]. Furthermore, its efficiency on the REPLAY-
ATTACK database was presented in [7].
In [11], Pereira et al. used a spatio-temporal texture feature
called Local Binary Patterns from Three Orthogonal Planes
(LBP-TOP). According to the experimental results on the
REPLAY-ATTACK database, it outperformed the LBP-based
method in [23]. In [10], it is shown that LBP and LBP-TOP
features are applicable in intra-database protocol. However,
the countermeasures performance degraded much in a more
realistic scenario, i.e., inter-database protocol. The reason for
the low generalization ability of texture features was partially
explained in the paper [35]. The authors found many factors
may affect the textures on a face image, including abnormal
shadings, highlights, device noises, etc. Actually, the usage
of texture features are not confined in above papers. In the
1st and 2nd competition on 2D face anti-spoofing [4] [8],
most of the teams used textures as clues for anti-spoofing.
2) Motion-based Anti-Spoofing: Beyond the texture fea-
tures, motion is another cues for face anti-spoofing. In
[29][24], Pan et al. used eye blinking for face anti-spoofing.
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In their method, a conditional random field was constructed
to model different stages of eye blinking. In [18], Kollreider
et al. used lip movement classification and lip-reading for
the purpose of liveness detection. The system requires users
to utter a sequence of words, and then verify whether the
observed lip dynamics fit in the words. Furthermore, Chetty
et al. [5][6] proposed a multi-modal approach to aggrandize
the difficulty of spoofing attacks. It determined the liveness
by verifying the fitness between video and audio signals.
On the other hand, some previous works focused on phys-
ical motions for anti-spoofing. In [3], Bao et al. presented
a method using optical flow fields to distinguish 2-D planar
photography attacks and 3-D real faces. Similarly, Kollreider
et al. [16] [19] also relied their method on optical flow
analysis. The method is based on the assumption that a 3-
D face generates a special 2-D motion which is higher at
central face parts (e.g. nose) compared to the outer face
regions (e.g. ears). More recently, Anjos et al. proposed to
recognize spoofing attacks based on the correlation between
optical flows in foreground and background regions [1]. At
the same time, Yang et al. presented a counter measure
to replay attacks based on the correlations among optical
magnitude/phase sequences from 11 regions, which won the
first place after combining with a texture-based method [8].
Besides, Kollreider et al. [17] used eye-blinking and face
movements for detecting liveness in an interaction scenario.
3) 3D Shape-based Anti-Spoofing: In [12], Marsico et al.
proposed a method for moving face anti-spoofing based
on 3D projective invariants. However, this method can
merely cope with photo attacks without warping, because the
coplanar assumption is invalid for warped photos. Though
warped photos do not satisfy the coplanar constrains as
real face, there are still some intrinsic differences between
them. In [33], the authors proposed to recover sparse 3D
shapes for face images to detect various photo attacks. The
performance on different warping types (none, vertically and
horizontally) are evaluated, which showed that the method
worked perfectly under both intra-database protocols and
inter-database protocols. However, both methods will fail
when coping with 3D mask spoofing, such as the 3D Mask
Attack database (3DMAD) collected by Erdogmus et al. [13].
4) Multi-Spectral Reflectance-based Anti-Spoofing: The
multi-spectral methods utilize the illuminations beyond vi-
sual spectrum for detect spoofing attacks. In [26] and [37],
the authors selected proper working spectrums so that the
reflectance differences between genuine and fake faces in-
creased. Different from the methods directly using reflection
intensities, a gradient-based multi-spectral method for face
anti-spoofing was proposed in [14]. The authors studied three
illumination-robust features and evaluated the performance
on different spectral bands. However, these methods need
extra devices to capture face images under the invisible
lights, thus it is unpractical to deploy such devices to the
most of recent FR systems, which are merely based on RGB
color face images.
Moreover, some works combined two or more of above
four kinds of approaches. In [25], Pan et al. integrated
scene context into their earlier eye blinking based anti-
spoofing scheme. However, the so-called scene context is
non-existed in many cases, such as the PRINT-ATTACK
database. Toward the PRINT-ATTACK database, Tronci et al.
employed motion, texture and liveness [32] and achieved
perfect performance on development set and test set. On the
same database, Yan et al. [34] explored multiple scenic clues,
including non-rigid motion, face-background consistency and
image banding effect, to detect the spoofing attacks, which
achieved 100% accuracy on the test set. Recently, Chin-
govska et al proposed to integrate face recognition module
into anti-spoofing system in score-level and feature level [2].
III. METHOD
A. Data Preparation
Fig. 2. Face alignment process on an example image. From left to right,
the face location is gradually refined based on face landmarks.
1) face localization: Before face anti-spoofing, face lo-
calization is indispensable. In previous works, a common
face detector, e.g., Viola-Jones in OpenCV, is enough for this
task. However, such rectangle-wise detector cannot provide
precise face locations. Therefore, we implement the face
alignment algorithm proposed in [28] after a common Viola-
Jones face detection. In the training stage, we extracts a set
of local binary features, which are then used to learn a linear
regressors in each cascade. During testing, an initial rectangle
is provided by face detector, followed by a cascaded regres-
sion for the final output, i.e. a group of face landmarks. After
obtaining the landmarks, their bounding box is regarded
as the final face location. As shown in Fig. 2, the initial
rectangle is refined gradually based on face landmarks to
obtain a more precise face location.
2) spatial augmentation: Different from some other face-
oriented algorithms, such as face detection and face recog-
nition, face anti-spoofing is more like an image quality
diagnosing issue. Beyond the conventional face region, the
backgrounds are helpful for the classification as well. In [4],
the team UOULU exploited background region for feature
extraction, and achieved best performance in the competition.
In [35], the authors enlarged the conventional face region to
contain a part of background, and proved the positive role
of background region with various feature types. Inspired
by their works, we also propose to enlarge the face region
to contain background region. However, the difference is
that we tend to use more backgrounds in our method.
Though it is shown in [35] that extra background made
no difference on the face anti-spoofing performance, we
argue that the hand-crafted features the author used encounter
bottlenecks to exploit more information from background
Fig. 3. Sample images with different spatial scales are shown. The first
two rows are from CASIA dataset and the two rows at bottom are from
REPLAY-ATTACK dataset. The even rows are genuine, and odd rows are
fake.
Fig. 4. Brief illustration of CNN architecture used in this paper.
regions. Alternatively, the CNN is more capable of learning
discriminative features from backgrounds.
As shown in Fig. 3, we prepare the input images with
five scales. Images corresponding to the first scale merely
contain face region. With the increase of scale, images
contain more background regions. As for CASIA-FASD
dataset, we can easily find that fake images in large-scale
contain boundaries of photographs compared with genuine
images, which should be exploited as discriminative cues for
anti-spoofing. In another case as REPLAY-ATTACK dataset,
though fake images have no boundary cues, they contains
blurred edges and probable abnormal specular reflections
caused by re-capturing compared with genuine samples in
whole images [35].
3) temporal augmentation: Besides spatial augmentations
above, we also propose to augment the data temporally.
Multiple frames are expected to improve the anti-spoofing
performance due to more informative data. This has been
proved by [11] to some extent, in which a spatial-temporal
texture feature was extracted from consecutive frames. When
fed more than one frame, the CNN can not only learn the
spatial features, but also temporal features for anti-spoofing.
In this paper, we train CNN model using both single frame
and multiple frames, and figure out whether multiple frames
are helpful for CNN to learn more discriminative features.
B. Feature Learning
In this paper, we implement a canonical CNN structure for
learning features. Specifically, we adopt the configuration in
[21], which won the ImageNet large scale visual recognition
challenge (LSVRC) in 2012. A brief illustration of the CNN
structure is presented in Fig. 4. In the network, there are
five convolutional (Conv) layers, followed by three fully-
connected (FC) layers. In the convolutional layers, response-
normalization layers are used for the outputs of the first
and second convolutional layers. The max-pooling layers are
plug to process the outputs of the first, second and the last
convolutional layers. The ReLU non-linearity is applied to
the output of every convolutional and fully-connected layer.
To avoid over-fitting, the first two fully-connected layers are
followed by two dropout layers, and the last layer, i.e. output
layer is followed by softmax.
C. Classification
After learning the CNNs, we extract the features from
the last fully-connected layer. Then, support vector machine
(SVM) is used to learn the classifiers from train data for face
anti-spoofing. In this paper, the LibSVM toolkit [9] is used.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Settings
In our experiments, to organize the data, we first detect
faces in images via detector from OpenCV. After that, we
use the method in Sec. III-A.1 to refine the face regions as
the bounding boxes of face landmarks. Then, the bounding
boxes are reset to contain most of the face regions, as shown
in the first column Fig. 3. To make use of the information
in backgrounds, we enlarge the original ones with re-scaling
ratios {1.4, 1.8, 2.2, 2.6}. Finally, all input images are resized
to 128 × 128. Besides above spatial augmentations, we use
consecutive frames to augment the data temporally. In our
experiments, the number of input face images is from one
to three. For the CNN, we use Caffe toolbox [15] and adopt
a commonly used structure, which was ever used in [21].
In the training of CNN, the learning rate is 0.001; decay
rate is 0.001; and the momentum during training is 0.9.
Before fed into the CNN, the data are first centralized by
the mean of training data. These parameters are constant in
our experiments. Given the learned feature, we use SVM
with RBF kernel to train classifiers for antis-spoofing.
B. Datasets
In this paper, the experiments are implemented on two
datasets, CASIA and REPLAY-ATTACK datasets. In these
two datasets, various spoofing types are simulated. Follow-
ings are the brief introduction of two databases:
• CASIA database [36]: This database contains 50 sub-
jects in total. For each subject, the genuine faces are
captured under three qualities. The spoofing images are
fabricated by implementing three kind of attacks, i.e.,
warped photo attack, cut photo attack and electronic
screen attack in three qualities, respectively. As a result,
each subject has 12 sequences (3 genuine and 9 fake
ones). The overall number of sequences in the database
is 600.
• REPLAY-ATTACK database [7]: It also contains 50
subjects. For each subject, four genuine video sequences
are collected in front of two backgrounds. Similar
to CASIA, three spoofing types are used, including
print attack, digital photo attack, and video attack. The
spoofing sequences are captured under fixed and hand-
hold conditions. The overall number of sequences in the
database is 1200.
C. Protocol
To make fair comparison with recent works, we use the
Half Total Error Rate (HTER) to report the performance.
After training, the development set is used to determine the
threshold corresponding to Equal Error Rate (EER). Then the
threshold is used for the computation of HTER on test set.
Similar to [10], we divide the training set in CASIA dataset
into five folds, and one of them is used as development
set and the others for training. The final performance is
obtained by averaging the results from five cross validations.
In REPLAY-ATTACK dataset, the development set is already
given. There is no need to divide the original sets.
Along with the protocols in [10], we conduct intra-test
on each dataset, and inter-test to evaluate the generalization
ability of our method. Moreover, we also combine two
datasets to evaluate our method.
D. Results of Intra-test
1) Test on CASIA dataset: We test our method on CASIA
dataset in five different spatial scales from one frame to three
frames. In Table I, the HTERs on development set and test
set are shown. In the table, the average performance over
scales and frames are presented al well. As we can see,
with the increase of spatial scale, the anti-spoofing model
perform better than that of original scale, and achieves the
best when the scale is equal to 3 averagely. These results
indicate the positive effect of background region on face
anti-spoofing task. Actually, similar claim has been proved
in [35]. However, the difference is that images corresponding
to the best scale in this paper are larger than that in [35],
which shows the CNN can extract more useful information
from the background region compared with the hand-crafted
features. However, when the scale reaches 5, the performance
degrades slightly. One possible reason is that the diversity
of background region weakens the positive effect. As for
the number of frames used, the model trained using one
frame outperform gently the models trained with more than
one frames in average. However, when reviewing the results
closely, we find the best performance is obtained by using
two frames with scale 2. This specific result indicates multi-
frame input is positive in certain cases.
For details, we show the corresponding ROC curves in
Fig. 5. From the results, we can find input data with scale
2, 3, 4 improve the anti-spoofing consistently over different
frames. These results further show that the background
region is useful for distinguishing genuine and fake face
images. However, the improvement may discount when con-
taining too much background.
2) Test on REPLAY-ATTACK dataset: On Replay-Attack
dataset, we also report the performance under 15 scenarios.
In Table II, we present the EERs and HTERs for different
image scales and frame numbers used. In the table, we
find some differences from CASIA dataset: (1) the lowest
HTER occurs at scale = 1, instead of a larger scale; (2)
EERs on development set are larger than HTER on test set.
These differences are mainly caused by the bias between
development and test sets. On the test set, the models achieve
accuracies all above 97%, which are 2%-5% higher than the
development set. To evaluate the performance more compre-
hensively, we draw the ROC curves for all scenarios in Fig. 6.
Accordingly, with the increase of scale, the performance
improve gradually. When trained using input data with scale
5, the anti-spoofing achieves nearly perfect performance.
3) Comparison: For comparison, Table III shows the
intra-test results on CASIA dataset in [10]. As mentioned
before, we use the same protocols as [10] for fair comparison.
In [10], the lowest EER is 21.59 on CASIA dataset, while
it is 4.64 in our paper. Meanwhile, the lowest HTER in [10]
is more than 4 times of ours. Such drastic improvements
also occur on the REPLAY-ATTACK dataset. Such promising
results indicate that the CNN can learn more discriminative
features from input data compared with various hand-crafted
features.
TABLE III
INTRA-TEST RESULTS ON CASIA AND REPLAY-ATTACK DATASET IN
[10].
Feature
Correlation LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 LBP
u2
8,1
Dataset dev test dev test dev test
CASIA 26.65 30.33 21.59 23.75 24.63 23.19
Replay-Attack 11.66 11.79 8.17 8.51 14.41 15.45
E. Results of Inter-test
For face anti-spoofing, its adaptation ability from one
dataset to another is important for practical applications.
In this part, we will evaluate such ability of CNN models.
Similar to [10], we first train our model using the training
set from CASIA dataset, and then validate and test it using
Replay-Attack dataset. This procedure is then inverted, i.e.,
using Replay-Attack dataset for training and CASIA dataset
for development and testing. In this inter-test procedure,
training data is used to tune the CNN models and train
SVM classifiers, which are then used to extract features
and perform evaluation on the development and test sets,
respectively. When extracting features from development and
test sets, the mean of training data is used for centralizations
of development and testing data.
As shown in Table IV, the top four lines show the EERs
and HTERs when using CASIA for training and REPLAY-
ATTACK for testing; and the bottom four lines present
results from the inverse. For comparison, we show the
performance of [] in Table V. Accordingly, the performance
of our method is analogous to that in [10] when the scale
TABLE I
INTRA-TEST RESULTS ON CASIA DATASET. THE EERS AND HTERS ARE PRESENTED FOR DIFFERENT DATA AUGMENTATIONS.
Scale
1 2 3 4 5 Mean
dev test dev test dev test dev test dev test dev test
Frame
1 7.06 7.38 5.44 5.58 4.92 5.09 5.81 5.84 6.98 6.99 6.04 6.18
2 7.50 8.05 4.87 4.95 5.51 4.95 6.41 5.53 8.12 7.53 6.48 6.20
3 7.80 7.46 5.61 5.69 4.64 5.21 4.68 5.60 8.09 7.95 6.16 6.38
Mean 7.45 7.63 5.31 5.41 5.02 5.08 5.63 5.66 7.73 7.49 6.23 6.25
TABLE II
INTRA-TEST RESULTS ON REPLAY-ATTACK DATASET.
Scale
1 2 3 4 5 Mean
dev test dev test dev test dev test dev test dev test
Frame
1 6.10 2.14 3.51 3.20 4.47 3.13 3.41 2.29 4.14 2.53 4.33 2.66
2 8.72 2.57 2.54 3.09 3.74 2.81 3.55 2.98 3.77 2.55 4.46 2.80
3 7.17 2.19 3.50 3.28 3.71 2.86 3.05 2.32 3.45 2.21 4.18 2.57
Mean 7.33 2.30 3.18 3.19 3.97 2.93 3.37 2.53 3.82 2.43 4.32 2.68
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Fig. 5. ROC curves for different data augmentations on CASIA dataset. From left to right, the curves are obtained from models trained using one frame,
two frames and three frames, respectively.
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Fig. 6. ROC curves for different data augmentations on REPLAY-ATTACK dataset. The display order is similar to Fig. 5.
is 1, which indicates that both hand-crafted and learned
features are incapable of capturing common cues from face
regions across datasets. However, with the scale increased,
such a situation changes. For the REPLAY-ATTACK dataset,
the testing performance improves gradually, and the lowest
HTER approaches to 23.78 when using one frame with scale
5. Similarly on the CASIA dataset, the HTER also decreases
when input data contains backgrounds. The lowest HTER
is 38.11 when using three frames with scale 4 as input. In
Fig. 7 and 8, we show the ROC curves for different inter-test
scenarios.
According the experiments in this part, we can find the
cross-datasets anti-spoofing is far from satisfactory. Due to
different devices, illuminations, races, etc., there are some
inevitable biases among two datasets. In this case, the inter-
dataset can hardly obtain analogous performance to the intra-
test situation. Fortunately, we find in our experiments that
background regions can boost the generalization ability of
anti-spoofing model.
F. Results on Combined Datasets
In this part, we assume training data from two datasets
are available. As the protocols proposed in [10], our models
are trained and developed on combined datasets, and then
evaluated on each dataset. In Table VI, we show the EERs
and HTERs of all scenarios. Compared with the results in
TABLE IV
INTER-TEST RESULTS ON CASIA AND REPLAY-ATTACK DATASETS.
Scale
1 2 3 4 5 Mean
dev test dev test dev test dev test dev test dev test
Frame
1 48.22 48.80 50.17 50.56 41.39 38.02 33.16 36.51 38.80 23.78 42.25 39.53
2 49.60 51.58 45.85 46.39 49.20 44.02 35.53 34.93 42.82 38.21 44.60 43.03
3 51.37 55.16 48.17 47.34 39.25 34.90 30.63 32.14 33.47 38.03 40.58 41.51
Mean 49.73 51.91 48.06 48.10 43.28 38.98 33.10 34.53 38.36 33.34 42.48 41.36
Frame
1 45.76 45.49 43.02 43.63 39.33 39.31 39.97 40.03 41.90 42.42 42.00 42.18
2 46.48 46.81 42.70 42.88 38.29 38.38 40.24 40.49 39.88 40.88 41.52 41.89
3 46.07 46.43 43.25 42.97 40.88 40.78 38.91 38.11 41.18 41.91 42.06 42.04
Mean 46.10 46.24 42.99 43.16 39.50 39.49 39.71 39.54 40.10 41.74 41.86 42.04
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
False Rejection Rate (FRR)
Fa
ls
e 
Ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 R
at
e 
(F
AR
)
s=1, f=1
s=2, f=1
s=3, f=1
s=4, f=1
s=5, f=1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
False Rejection Rate (FRR)
Fa
ls
e 
Ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 R
at
e 
(F
AR
)
s=1, f=2
s=2, f=2
s=3, f=2
s=4, f=2
s=5, f=2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
False Rejection Rate (FRR)
Fa
ls
e 
Ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 R
at
e 
(F
AR
)
s=1, f=3
s=2, f=3
s=3, f=3
s=4, f=3
s=5, f=3
Fig. 7. ROC curves of inter-test for different inputs. The models are trained on CASIA dataset, and developed and tested on REPLAY-ATTACK dataset.
The display order is similar to Fig. 5.
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Fig. 8. ROC curves of inter-test. The models are trained on REPLAY-ATTACK dataset, and developed and tested on CASIA dataset. The display order
is similar to Fig. 7.
TABLE V
INTER-TEST RESULTS ON CASIA AND REPLAY-ATTACK DATASETS IN
[10].
Feature
Correlation LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 LBP
u2
8,1
Training Set dev test dev test dev test
CASIA 50.23 50.25 48.97 50.64 44.97 47.05
Replay-Attack 47.72 48.28 60.00 61.33 57.32 57.90
[10] (Table VII), our method achieves much better result on
both datasets. On the CASIA dataset, we obtain comparable
performance to the intra-test; On the REPLAY-ATTACK
dataset, the average HTERs are less than 1% when scale = 4
and 5. In Fig. 9, we show ROC curves of different cases. We
can find the models trained using samples from two dataset
perform similarly to those in the intra-test, which illustrates
that CNN are able to learn common features from such two
datasets. Moreover, compared with [10], the performance is
not biased as much between two datasets due to the powerful
feature learning ability of CNN.
G. Discussion
Thus far, we have evaluated our method in various cases.
From the experimental results, we show that the proposed
method has achieved much better performance in all testing
protocols. These encouraging results prove the power of
CNN once again, but the first time in face anti-spoofing.
Compared with previous hand-crafted features, such a data-
driven feature designing rules out the empirical part, and
come up with some more efficient features for face anti-
spoofing. Moreover, it should be pointed out that we did
not pay attentions on parameter selecting for CNN, but we
believe that a better model can be obtained after some efforts
on it.
Beyond the powerful feature learning toolkit, we also
proposed many data augmentation strategies, including spa-
tial and temporal augmentations. By augmenting the input
data, we further improve face anti-spoofing performance in
all protocols. These improvements suggests that background
region is indeed helpful for face anti-spoofing to some
extent when using CNN-learned or hand-crafted features
[35]. Though the improvements are seen on both datasets,
there are some difference to be pointed out. Specifically, on
the CASIA dataset, the best scale is 3, while 5 for REPLAY-
ATTACK dataset. This inconsistency can be explained by
the input data partially. In the CASIA dataset, all sequences
of spoofing attacks contain real-world backgrounds as real-
access sequences. However, all background regions are filled
by fake photos in REPLAY-ATTACK dataset. As a result,
when the scale is too large, genuine and fake samples in
CASIA dataset become more similar rather than different,
whereas they are more discriminative on REPLAY-ATTACK
dataset. At this point, we argue that face anti-spoofing should
not be regarded as a classification problem on faces, but one
on the regions where fake faces are shown.
TABLE VII
RESULTS OF DATA COMBINATION PROTOCOL ON CASIA AND
REPLAY-ATTACK DATASETS IN [10].
Feature
Correlation LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1 LBP
u2
8,1
Testing Set dev test dev test dev test
CASIA 12.18 43.30 14.29 42.04 20.45 45.92Replay-Attack 24.14 10.67 10.07
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we have proposed to use CNN to learn
features for face anti-spoofing. Upon the CNN model, we
tried different data augmentation strategies. According to the
experimental results. The proposed method make a signifi-
cant improvement compared with previous works in different
protocols. In the intra-test and combination protocols, we
have achieved HTERs lower than 5% on two datasets. In the
inter-test protocol, there are also remarkable improvements.
However, we must point out that the proposed method is still
not able to obtain satisfactory performance in the inter-test
protocol. As we discussed before, due to different capturing
conditions, the biases among different datasets are inevitable.
Towards this point, one of our future work is to find out a
way to adapt the learned model to new data based on transfer
learning. Also, integrating other cues, such as motions and
shapes is another direction.
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Fig. 9. ROC curves for data combination protocol. The top three figures show models tested on CASIA dataset, and the bottom three figures show
performance of models tested on REPLAY-ATTACK dataset.
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